Beginning with an introduction to the life and times of Plato, this text is a dialogue between a fictional Plato and a contemporary college student with majors both in business and philosophy.

Benjamin S. Bloom and a large committee of educators did extensive research to develop a taxonomy of global educational goals and of ways to measure their achievement in the classroom. The result was a taxonomy of three domains: Cognitive, Affective, and Motor Skills. This paper examines the cognitive and affective domains and applies them to teaching business ethics. Each of the six levels of the cognitive domain is explained. A six-step case method model is used to illustrate how the six (...) cognitive levels might be used and tested in the classroom. The five levels of the affective domain are also described. They are illustrated behaviorally in terms of a student's increasing interest, motivation and commitment to business ethics. (shrink)

What follows is a brief description of the origin and development, results, and future plans of the Gadfly Business Ethics Project at Bentley College.Viewing himself as selected by the god to be a gadfly to sting the great and noble but sluggish horse, the city of Athens, Socrates says.

This study provides evidence regarding the level of ethical cognition of business students at the entry to college as compared to a national norm. It also provides comparative evidence on the effects of group versus individual ethical cognition upon completion of a business ethics course. The Principled Score (P-score) from the Defining Issues Test (DIT) was used to measure the ethical cognition of a total sample of 301 business students (273 entering students plus 28 students in a business ethics course). (...) The results indicate that (1) business students are not significantly different from the national norms at entry to college and (2) group reasoning helps male students improve their P-scores significantly in the business ethics course at a loss of P-score (albeit not statistically significant) for female students. (shrink)

Mark McKenna, The Captive Republic: A History of Republicanism in Australia, 1788-1996 , xiv + 334 pp., ?40.00, ISBN 0 521 5728 4. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government , xii + 304 pp., ?25.00, ISBN 0 19 8290837. Bruce Scates, A New Australia: Citizenship, Radicalism and the First Republic , viii + 261 pp., ?45.00, ISBN 0 521 57296 7.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Council's Solar CalendarFrancis M. DunnIt is well known that for some time during the fifth century, the calendar used by the council in Athens to conduct its business ("prytany calendar") employed a year of a different length from that of the calendar used by the archon to schedule religious events ("festival calendar"). In the fourth century the archon's calendar consisted of twelve or thirteen lunar months, while the (...) council's calendar divided the same year of 354 or 383/4 days into ten prytanies, one for each tribe. For at least part of the fifth century, however, the two calendars ran for different periods, and began and ended at different times. The nature of this independent or noncoterminous year has been debated, and a consensus seems to be emerging that it was a schematic year of 366 days.1 In what follows I show that this schematic year is highly improbable and propose a new reconstruction of the council's calendar.In 1894 Bruno Keil demonstrated that in the late fifth century the archon's calendar of months did not begin or end at the same time as the council's calendar of prytanies.2 This finding was confirmed by subsequent scholars, who offered different explanations: Meritt (1928, esp. 72) argued that the council's calendar followed the solar year and was introduced by Cleisthenes, whereas Dinsmoor (1931, esp. 327–29) argued that it followed a precise astronomical scheme and was introduced by Meton. Meritt was able to show (1932, 152–58) that Dinsmoor's elaborate scheme was not consistent with known dates from the period, but he did not develop or explain his own hypothesis of approximate solar years. One crucial piece of evidence has been the Logistai Inscription (IG I3 369 [423/2]). From the accounts on this stone Kubicki and Meritt had shown that interest for the quadrennium 426/5 to 423/2 was calculated for 1,464 days, so that for those years the council's calendar averaged [End Page 369] 366 days.3 Meritt went on (1928, 70–71) to reconstruct four years of 366, 368, 365, and 365 days respectively for the period 426/5 to 423/2. This approximate solar year seemed to agree with the calendar equations for 423/2 ( = Prytany 10.2, IG I3 369 78–79) and 412/1 (Skirophorion 14 = Prytany 1.1, Arist. Ath. Pol. 32.1), from which he calculated an average of 365 4/11 days for the council's year during the period 423/2 to 412/1 (1928, 84–85). Meritt's view, in other words, was that the independent calendar of the council followed the solar (tropical) year, but because the council's calendar was not rigid or consistent, its agreement with the solar year was not exact.4Pritchett, however, has argued that the council's year consisted of fixed and regular prytanies.5 On this view, it follows that the quadrennium 426/5 to 423/2 consisted of four equal years, and Pritchett was able to show that the accounts on the Logistai Inscription were consistent with a schematic council calendar of 366 days comprising six 37–day prytanies followed by four 36–day prytanies in each year of the quadrennium.6 In support of this view, Pritchett added the negative argument (1964, 40–41, 49–50) that Meritt's average of 365 4/11 days for the subsequent period from 423/2 to 412/1 depends upon a contested reading of the Logistai Inscription and upon speculation concerning the calendar between 423/2 and 412/1. He added the positive argument (Pritchett and Neugebauer 1947, 95–96) that his own scheme is consistent with two additional inscriptions: rates of pay in the Erechtheum accounts imply that there were 37 days in Prytany 6 (IG I3 476 60–63 [408/7]) and 36 days in Prytany 8 (IG I3 476 266–70), while dates on the Choiseul Marble include Prytany 8.36, Prytany 9.36, and Prytany 10.36 (IG I3 375 29–34 [410/9]). The evidence is somewhat circumstantial, but taken as a whole it strongly... (shrink)

Excerpt from The Warfare of Democratic Ideals There is at least one novel quality in the current warfare of democratic ideals. Probably never before has there been so much disagreement and confusion as to the determination of the mean ing of democracy. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving (...) the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Freedom interpreted as absence of restraints, as such, is a vacuous ideal. It requires reference to some setting and course of action in order to distinguish those restraints that block human effort from those, say, that support it. More broadly, this notion of freedom has little meaning and less value without some external criterion for evaluating human action and its conditions. Many thinkers have argued that the. criterion must be the absolute Truth ? truth that is unconditioned, indubitable, and imperative. (...) They have often argued that there is no freedom of error, and that the many persons who do not know such Truth are free only in obeying the few who do. This concept of freedom is often regarded as intolerable. A third possibility is to interpret freedom as a name for a range of significant alternatives for thought and action. Freedom, here, is compatible with truth interpreted in terms of the process of inquiry, rather than as substantive possession. It is a necessary condition for judging which restraints are real obstacles and which courses of action may be harmless, legitimate or good. The third meaning, especially, is illustrated with reference to the freedoms of utterance (expression) and speech (communication). (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Cross‐Cultural Perspectives on Human Rights Democratic Participation in the Cultural Context Development as a Process of Self‐Enhancement from Within Conclusion.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Antiphon on Time (B9 D-K)Francis M. DunnThe simplest and clearest formulation of Antiphon's understanding of time is the statement that time is a concept or measure, not a substance (87 B9 Diels-Kranz). This fragment is regularly cited in discussions of Antiphon, but Richard Sorabji has stated that it belongs not to Antiphon the sophist but to a minor peripatetic. He gives no argument in support of this statement,1 (...) but given the potential importance of this fragment both for the views of Antiphon and for early theories of time, we must consider whether or not its attribution is secure.Antiphon or Antiphanes?Fragment 9 in Diels-Kranz is a brief entry from the Placita of Aetius (1.22.6) under the heading, preserved in Stobaeus (1.8.40b):2P, F mrg., PhotiusIn the text of Diels-Kranz, emphasis is used to distinguish the quote or citation proper (νόημα ) from the gloss or clarification that accompanies it (). The distinction seems to me correct: since it is not immediately obvious what it means to regard time as a "concept or measure" (and two thinkers may have done so in different ways), the gloss is an attempt by the compiler to delimit this (shared) view. The delimiting term is relatively late ( with the implied meaning "substance" is not attested before Aristotle and Theophrastus; [End Page 65] cf. LSJ sv III). So if the first thinker cited is Antiphon the sophist, usage confirms that the term was later supplied by the compiler; on the other hand, if we suspend judgment on the identity of Antiphon (or Antiphanes), this late usage does not help to date the view that time is νόημα.This brings us to the attribution of the fragment: was Diels correct in printing? and was he correct in identifying this figure as the Athenian sophist? Taking the first question first, we must consider the possibility that the marginal gloss in F was meant as a correction, and that the lemma assigning the fragment to Antiphanes should be followed. Context, however, clearly indicates otherwise. Under the rubric, the compiler of the Placita3 has assembled the views of various philosophers: Plato, Xenocrates, Hestiaeus of Perinthus, Straton, Epicurus, Critolaus and the Stoics (1.22.1-7). Antiphon the sophist is repeatedly cited in this compilation (2.20.15, 2.28.4, 2.29.3, 3.16.4), whereas Antiphanes the comic poet is never cited at all. The textual confusion arose because this portion of the Placita was extracted by Stobaeus, who also quoted profusely from Antiphanes and other comic poets. To scribes copying Stobaeus, the playwright's name suggested itself more readily than that of the sophist, and the former therefore began to replace the latter.4I have assumed so far (as all editors have done) that the textual variants and entail a choice between Antiphon the sophist and Antiphanes the comic poet. Faced with such a choice, we must choose Antiphon, but Sorabji suggests a third alternative, namely that Antiphon or Antiphanes is a late and obscure peripatetic philosopher. What are the merits of such a suggestion?A Minor Peripatetic?Sorabji's Antiphon (or Antiphanes) is so obscure that he has otherwise vanished without leaving a trace. We must therefore decide if it is [End Page 66] likely that the Placita not only cited such an individual, but made no attempt to distinguish him from well-known authors who bore the same name. It is worth noting that the compiler of the Placita made no particular attempt to rescue from oblivion the beliefs of insignificant thinkers. Under each rubric he is chiefly concerned with reporting the doctrines of influential philosophers such as Thales, Democritus or Aristotle. The range of views on a given topic may be broadened by including lesser figures, but these are almost always easily identifiable and well-attested in other sources. The reasons for the flooding of the Nile (4.1), for example, are taken from Thales, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Eudoxus, Herodotus and Ephorus; the notion that the river is filled from a fresh-water sea is cited from a lesser figure, Euthymenes of Massilia, who is therefore identified by his place of birth... (shrink)

LIFE offers various amusements, and anyone these days who can choose among them will come late to the study of hiatus in Greek prose. Germany in the 1880s, so it seems, was less fortunate, and few greater excitements were known to young or old than the hunt for hiatus; but now that we no longer strait-waistcoat our classical authors and the austerity of those times is discredited, few collectors of hiatus are to be found, and there are people even in (...) Germany who have never identified a single specimen. Yet there is nothing to be said for underrating an author' stylistic pretensions, still less for encouraging others to do the same; and the textual critic, whose path is slippery enough at the best of times, can ill afford to dispense with footholds. There has been no broad study of hiatus in Greek prose since 1841, when Benseler in a long and original book De hiatu in oratoribus et historicis Graecis went through the text of 27 authors and attempted to determine their practice. (shrink)